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ABSTRACT: This research examines the effect of ownership structure and good corporate governance on firm 
performance. The research variables used were foreign ownership, institutional ownership, government 
ownership, size of the board of commissioners, and size of non-financial sector companies on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange throughout 2013-2017. This study deployed a quantitative approach through multiple linear regression 
analysis, with a total sample of 1,650 observations. 
 The research findings were foreign ownership, government ownership; board commissioner size had a 
significant positive effect on firm performance while institutional ownership and firm size had a significant 
negative effect on firm performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ownership structure and corporate governance 
will have an impact on firm performance. The firm’s 
ownership structure may consist of foreign, 
institutional, and government ownership. Corporate 
governance is the art of leading and controlling the 
company by balancing the desires of shareholders. 
Corporate governance can be associated with agency 
theory - a contractual relationship whereby the 
principal makes an agreement with the agent to act 
following the interests of the shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Good ownership structure and 
corporate governance are essential factors in today's 
complex environment. Yussof and Alhaji (2012) 
stated that good governance practices are the actions 
of the board of directors to ensure the interests of 
investors are not threatened. 
Studies conducted by Aurori et al. (2014), Ghazali 
(2010), and Mollah et al., (2012), provide conflicting 
evidence. Aurori et al. (2014) and Ghazali (2010) 
revealed that foreign ownership has a significant 
positive effect on firm performance, signifying that 
foreign investors have better technology and 
knowledge than domestic investors. However, Mollah 
et al. (2012) found the opposite, whereby foreign 
ownership has no significant effect. 
Another finding of Aurori et al. (2014) showed that 
institutional ownership has a significant positive effect 
on firm performance because institutional investors 
act as active monitors of the firm to maximize 
shareholder welfare. This finding is in contrast to 
Mollah et al., (2012) that proposed institutional 
ownership has no significant effect. 
Aurori et al., (2014) and Mollah et al., (2012) 
proved that government ownership has no effect on 
firm performance, while Ghazali (2010) uttered that 
the government could effectively monitor companies 
through their ownership in the company. Furthermore, 
Aurori et al., (2014) and Mollah et al., (2012) 
discovered the size of the board of commissioners has 
no significant effect, while Ghazali (2010) found the 
opposite result whereby the more the number of board 
of commissioners, the better the firm performance. 
For firm size, all Aurori et al., (2014), Ghazali (2010), 
and Mollah et al., (2012) showed that firm size is 
insignificant, meaning that large firm size does not 
affect firm performance. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODS
This research is categorized as a basic research type to 
explore, describe, and predict natural and social 
phenomena as well as quantitative research because it 
involves quantitative data in the data processing. 
Based on its objectives, this research is causal, 
because it examines the effect of foreign ownership, 
institutional ownership, government ownership, size 
of the board of commissioners, and firm size on firm 
performance on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
throughout 2013-2017. 
Operationally, firm performance is an indicator of 
firm performance measured from market aspects 
through Tobin's Q. 
Tobin’s Qit= total market value of firmit/ total equity 
valueit.....……… (1) 
Foreign ownership is the ownership or control of 
companies owned by foreign ownership in a business 
or individual entity (Bai et al. 2004). 
Foreign ownershipit = the percentage of foreign 
ownershipit.........................(2) 
Institutional ownership is the ownership or control 
of companies owned by institutions (Zheka 2005). 
Institutional ownershipit = the percentage of 
institutional ownershipit........………(3) 
Government ownership is the ownership or control 
of a company whose majority of share is owned by the 
government (Ghazali, 2010). 
Government ownershipit = the percentage of 
government ownershipit ... ……… (4) 
Size of the board of commissioners is the number 
of board of commissioners in the organizational 
structure. 
Size of the board of commissionersit = the number of 
the board of commissionersit ………...……… (5) 
According to Ferry and Jones (2001), firm size 
reflects the size of the firm shown by total assets. 
Sizeit=Lnit(Total Asset) …….………...……… (6) 
This study used panel data that is a combination of 
time series, cross-sections, and secondary data, 
namely historical data from the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange website (www.idx.co.id) in the form of the 
company's annual financial statements. The ratio level 
of measurement reflects the accurate value of the 
research object. 
The population of this study was all non-financial 
sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange throughout 2013-2017 with the following 
criteria: (1) listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
for five years, (2) published financial statements that 
have been audited for five years, and (3) all variable 
data available. (4) Has a positive equity value in the 
annual financial statements. 
The data processing method used was multiple 
linear regression. The dependent variable was Tobins' 
Q, while the independent variables were foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership, government 
ownership, size of the board of commissioners, and 
firm size. 
Tobins’Q = α + 𝛽
1
𝐹𝑂1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑂2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑂3𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽
4
𝐵 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒5𝑖𝑡 + e
Note: 
𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 : percentage of   foreign  share ownership in 
    period t 
𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 : percentage   of   share   ownership   by  the 
    institution in period t 
𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 : percentage of    share    ownership   by  the 
 government in period t 
𝐵 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 : number of the board of   commissioners in 
    period t 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 : firm size in period t 
α : constant coefficient 
β : regression coefficient 
e : error 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As described previously there are 4 criteria used, and 
the number of samples that meet the criteria is 330 
companies.. This amount comes from the screening of 
555 companies listed on the stock exchange. 
 After conducting the Chow test and Hausman test, 
it is known that the best model is the fixed effect 
model. This study has heteroscedasticity symptoms so 
that it uses the fixed-effect model of the White cross-
section (weight) method. The regression test results 
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can be seen in the following table. 





C 32.5458 34.2307 0.0000*** 
FO 0.3897 2.3664 0.0181** + 
IO -0.3196 -1.7652 0.0778* + 
GO 2.1563 2.0008 0.0456** + 
BSize 0.0397 5.7284 0.0000*** + 
Size -1.0605 -30.2055 0.0000*** + 
R-squared 0.9023 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8775 
F-Statistic 36.3601 
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 1.8903 
Note: * Sig. at 10%; ** Sig. at 5%; ***Sig. at 1% 
Tobins’Q = 32.54584 + 0.389698 FO – 0.319551 IO + 
2.156340 GO + 0.039658 B Size -
1.060471 Size 
3.1 The Effect of Foreign Ownership (FO) on Tobins' 
Q 
Table 1. shows that foreign ownership has a 
significant positive effect on Tobins'Q of 0.389698 at 
a significance level of 5%. This result is supported by 
Biekpe and Abor (2007) that said firms controlled by 
foreign investors could improve firm performance. 
Foreign investors have more sophisticated 
management skills and control systems, as well as 
specialized knowledge to reduce agency conflicts. 
This is supported by the experience of foreign 
investors in managing established international scale 
company. 
Hasketl et al., (2007) proved that an increase in a 
firm performance whose ownership is by foreign 
investors occurs due to foreign investors know 
sophisticated technology so that they can transfer 
technology. It is supported by Djankov and Hoekman 
(2012) that technology transfer will result in higher 
productivity. 
3.2 The Effect of Institutional Ownership (IO) on 
Tobins' Q 
Table 1. shows that institutional ownership has a 
significant negative effect on Tobins'Q of 0.319551 at 
a significance level of 10%. According to David and 
Kochar (1996), institutional investors act as "passive 
monitors", so they do not intervene in management. 
Meanwhile, according to Elyasiani and Jia (2010), 
institutional investors working with company 
management exploit minority shareholders. They also 
ignore the act of fraud to obtain benefits upon the 
actions they carried out. This increases the conflict of 
interest, which results in worsening firm performance. 
3.3 The Effect of Institutional Ownership (IO) on 
Tobins' Q 
Table 1 shows that institutional ownership has a 
significant negative effect on Tobins'Q of 0.319551 at 
a significance level of 10%. According to David and 
Kochar (1996), institutional investors act as "passive 
monitors", so they do not intervene in management. 
Meanwhile, according to Elyasiani and Jia (2010), 
institutional investors working with company 
management exploit minority shareholders. They also 
ignore the act of fraud to obtain benefits upon the 
actions they carried out. This increases the conflict of 
interest, which results in worsening firm performance. 
This result is supported by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), who proved that majority shareholders, 
namely institutional shareholders, play a dual role. On 
the one hand, they can utilize their power to take 
personal advantage by taking over minority share 
ownership. The higher the concentration of ownership 
by institutions, the lower the efficiency of corporate 
governance because institutional shareholders have 
personal goals that can harm minority shareholders. 
The unfavorable thing that can be done is in the form 
of a company takeover or acquisition, resulting in a 
conflict of interest between the institutional 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
3.4 The Effect of Government Ownership (GO) on 
Tobins' Q 
Table 1. shows that government ownership has a 
positive effect of 2.156340 on Tobins'Q at a 
significance level of 5%. This result is supported by 
Mejbel (2015) that scrutinized government-controlled 
companies are considered as companies operating in 
monopoly markets or markets with special 
regulations. Regulations made often have alignments 
that benefit the company, so they can be intervened to 
improve firm performance. In addition, Aljifri and 
Moustafa's research (2007) explained that in carrying 
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out their operations, companies owned by the 
government, receive strong support with high 
flexibility. 
3.5 The Effect of Size of the Board of Commissioners 
on Tobins' Q 
Table 1. shows that the result of size of the board of 
commissioners on Tobins'Q is 0.039658 at a 
significance level of 1%, which means that size of the 
board of commissioners has a significant positive 
effect on Tobins'Q. 
Researches by Dalton & Dalton, (2005); Pearce 
and Zahra, (1992) in Kumar and Singh (2013), 
explained that an increasing number of boards of 
commissioners could increase the monitoring capacity 
of a company and could increase the company's ability 
to build broader external relations. Management 
requires input from a large board of commissioners. 
Meanwhile, according to Erickson et al., (2005), 
the large size of the board of commissioners has the 
potential to cause many new problems and increase 
complexity in the decision-making process. As such, 
the greater the board of commissioner number 
involves, the longer the results of the decision, even 
though the board of commissioners is acting on behalf 
of the shareholders and as the main decision-maker. 
Therefore, complexity in decision making decreases 
the effectiveness of decision results. 
3.6 The Effect of Firm Size on Tobins' Q 
Table 1. shows that firm size has a significant 
negative effect on Tobins'Q on non-financial sector 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange throughout 
2013-2017. Claessens et al. (2006) study said bigger 
firm size triggers higher monitoring and agency costs. 
If the firm size is larger, external supervision is 
needed so that monitoring and agency costs increase, 
which results in a decrease in firm performance. This 
argument is in line with Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
who stated agency costs increase as the firm size 
grows. Sun et al. (2002) supported that the larger the 
firm size, the lower the level of efficiency because 
companies face much bureaucracy, so they have more 
significant agency problems.  
4. CONCLUSION
This study found ownership structure and corporate 
governance affect firm performance, which signifies 
that all foreign ownership, institutional ownership, 
government ownership, size of the board of 
commissioners, and firm size had a significant effect 
on Tobins' Q. 
For the hypothesis test, it was found that foreign 
ownership, government ownership, and size of the 
board of commissioners had a significant positive 
effect on Tobins'Q while institutional ownership and 
firm size had a significant negative effect on Tobins' 
Q. 
The values of R2 and adjusted – R2 are 0.9023 and 
0.8775, so it can be concluded that Tobins' Q can be 
well explained by foreign ownership, institutional 
ownership, government ownership, and size of the 
board of commissioners as well as firm size control 
variable. 
4.1 Recommendation for Investors 
As a reference to consider the factors that contribute 
to Tobins'Q determinants, namely Foreign Ownership, 
Institutional Ownership, Government Ownership, Size 
of the Board of Commissioners, and Firm Size in 
influencing the performance of non-financial 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
throughout 2013-2017. 
4.2 For Companies 
As a reference to determine the direction of firm 
policy that can improve firm performance in the 
future. 
4.3 For Future Researchers 
As a reference regarding the effect of ownership 
structure on firm performance in subsequent studies. 
This research has a limitation, namely observation of 
all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange throughout 2013-2017. For further 
research, it is advisable to use more sample coverage 
in order to obtain more accurate results by using the 
latest data. 
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